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Investments in K-12 Education for Minnesota: What Works?
Summary

Annually, 10,000 students leave Minnesota’s schools without a high school diploma.
When measured over the lifetime the economic consequences if a dropout becomes a
graduate are significant. We can express these consequences as the equivalent of a
certificate of deposit in terms of their values at age 20. The individual graduate gains the
equivalent of a CD worth $475,900 in extra earnings. The taxpayer gains the equivalent
of a CD worth $251,900 in increases in tax revenues and in lower expenditures on health,
crime, and welfare. The state of Minnesota gains the equivalent of a CD worth
$1,059,500 from the individual and taxpayer benefits plus lower crime victimization and
faster economic growth. The economic case for raising the high school graduation rate is
therefore strong.

The moral case for raising the high school graduation rate is also powerful. High
school graduation rates in Minnesota are stratified by race, sex, and family background.
The disparities begin in early childhood but are magnified through the K-12 years. Many
of the graduates then go on to college, leaving the high school dropouts further behind.
Althought Minnesota spends more on public education for disadvantaged students, the
difference is not substantial.

The search for effective educational interventions in K-12 schooling should
therefore be intensive. The quest should be primarily for interventions to raise the
graduation rate. But there is a strong correlation between achievement and graduation:
our review estimates that an increase in 8th grade achievement of one standard deviation
is associated with a 48% lower probability of dropping out of high school. So, the search
should also consider reforms that increase achievement.

However, the challenges to finding and selecting reforms are significant. Costeffectiveness studies require that the alternatives have similar educational goals and
comparable measurement of outcomes. Many studies claim to be educationally effective,
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but they are often based upon different measures of outcomes. Even when based upon
test scores, the results may be for different subjects, different grade levels, different
populations, and different test domains. Few studies that make claims for positive results
meet even the minimal standards for rigor in evaluation design and implementation.
And, almost none provide useful information for measuring costs. These conclusions
hold even if we expand our review to include interventions that raise achievement.

After an extensive review, we found only a few K-12 education reforms that have
demonstrated effectiveness in raising the graduation rate and whose costs can be
calculated with reasonable confidence. These reforms are:

Unit costs per
student

Increasing teacher salaries
Reducing class sizes in
elementary school across all
students
Reducing class sizes in
elementary school for free
lunch eligible students only
Success for All
Elementary school reform
First Things First
High school reform
Talent Development
High school reform with
career academy model
Check & Connect
High school mentoring
and monitoring program
Achievement for
Latinos through
Academic Success
High school program
monitoring behavior and
academic success

$2,850
$12,840

Extra high
school
graduates per
100 students
5
11

Costs per
additional
graduate
$56,850
$116,720

$12,840

18

$71,330

$3,842

4

$96,050

$5,440

16

$33,680

$2,790

8

$34,850

$8,150

17

$47,930

$3,940

5

$78,860
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When we compare the costs of these reforms to the economic benefits that flow
from high school graduation, we find the benefits to the taxpayer easily exceed the costs:

Increasing teacher salaries
Reducing class sizes across all students
Reducing class sizes for free lunch students
Success for All
First Things First
Talent Development
Check & Connect
Ach. for Latinos through Academic Success

Benefits to the taxpayer
divided by the costs of the
intervention
4.01
1.96
3.21
2.38
6.72
6.56
4.77
2.90

There are many other interventions with potential benefits, but either their
effectiveness is not fully demonstrated or there is inadequate information on costs.
Effective programs that may pass a cost-benefit test, but presently lack rigorous
evaluation data and cost information, include:
♦

Mentoring programs (12 Together, I Have a Dream)

♦

College readiness programs (CAP, TEACH, Talent Search)

♦

Employment readiness programs (Career Academies)

♦

Extended hours programs (After-school, summer school)

There are other areas of reform where more knowledge is critically needed for
reforming K-12 education. These include: specific programs (such as AVID, Project
GRAD, KIPPS academies, ISA model); reform related to teacher quality; and the range
of family interventions. (Pre-school is outside the scope of our review).

Overall, the evidence on what works – and what interventions pass a benefit-cost test – is
very limited. Accurate and detailed information on resource requirements necessary to
estimate costs is as sparse as rigorous evaluations on effectiveness. A major challenge is
to fill these crucial gaps to provide a more comprehensive list of educational
interventions by their cost-effectiveness and cost-benefit results. One method developed
in this paper to expand the numbers of programs that predict increases in high school
graduation is to provide a framework for converting test score increases at 8th grade or
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above into impacts on high school completion. This technique will enable us to embrace
a wide range of high school reforms that show improvements in student achievement, but
do not follow up students to graduation to show the impact on high school completion.
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1. Introduction
Social science evidence shows that a person’s high school attainment and achievement
plays a critical role in their adult well-being. On average, individuals who graduate from
high school will earn significantly more than drop outs, will report improved health
status, and will be much less likely to be involved in either the welfare system or the
criminal justice system. As well as these advantages for the individual, there are
significant economic benefits to the taxpayer and the general public from high school
graduation. The incentive to raise the graduation rate should therefore be strong (Belfield
and Levin 2007).
However, to raise the graduation rate it is necessary to find interventions that are
not only demonstrated to be effective but also shown to cost less than the economic
benefits they yield. On both counts this search is challenging. Few interventions have
been rigorously evaluated with respect to high school graduation; instead, many
interventions are proposed based on how they fit within a theory of educational
attainment or a plausible proposition about how students learn. As well, most
interventions are poorly described such that their ingredients – and so their costs – cannot
easily be identified. 1 Consequently, the accumulated evidence that something ought to
be done to raise attainment is stronger than the evidence on what to do.
In the last two years we have undertaken to identify educational interventions that
will increase high school graduation and to estimate both their effectiveness and costs as
well as to compare the public costs and benefits of each strategy. In some sense this is a
pioneering undertaking in that there is virtually no previous literature that addresses costeffectiveness of interventions to reduce high school dropouts. In fact, there is a paucity
of reliable cost-effectiveness studies addressing any aspect of education (Clune, 2002;
Levin, 2001). But, for this reason the policymaker should understand that the literature is
incomplete with respect to cost-effectiveness evaluations of all of the educational
interventions that might be considered, although there is a steady accumulation of recent
results.

1

Many interventions are proposed without any evidence of their effectiveness (Carneiro and Heckman
2002a, 87). Evaluations often fail to follow standard research methods (Neumark 2006, 315). Levin
(2001) describes as “rhetorical” the methods used in most economic evaluations.
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There are two reasons for the gaps in the literature. The first is that costeffectiveness requires a common criterion for comparison. We have addressed high
school completion as the principal goal, but many studies view improvement in test
scores. Even these are found in different subjects and different grade levels, each variant
making it difficult to compare results in common terms. Second, there are relatively few
systematic evaluations that provide reliable estimates of effectiveness for most
interventions, even the most promising ones. Such evaluations require a satisfactory
design for making comparisons, either an experimental or quasi-experimental design in
which threats to validity are minimized. In the absence of good evaluations, it is not
possible to make reliable cost-effectiveness estimates of educational alternatives.
Fortunately, more good evaluations are being produced over time. Finally, few
interventions provide the solid information that is needed for determining their costs. We
have found that statements of costs are often just casual guesses, with no description of
which costs are measured or how. Subsequent analyses find that many costs were
omitted, and others were not properly assessed. Thus, even when appropriate evaluation
methods are used, there is no accompanying information that can be used to provide
reliable and comparable measures of costs of alternatives.
For these reasons the reader should view the cost-effectiveness estimates an
emerging activity for presenting useful information for choosing among educational
alternatives. In this paper we have identified a number of alternatives for which we
believe the cost-effectiveness information is useful. But, we have also added a range of
other alternatives for which we believe we might obtain the data to provide additional
cost-effectiveness comparisons in the future. It is important that the reader understand
this overall context in reviewing the following.
Nevertheless, because the evidence on the benefits of education is so compelling,
it is still important to search for effective interventions. And because states bear the
heaviest burden of funding for education, this search should adopt a state perspective.
Therefore, our focus is on interventions in the K-12 school years for Minnesota. This
period of education is important not only because it is by far the longest but also because
it mediates early childhood education and because it is integral to ensuring students are
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ready for college. K-12 schooling is also important in ensuring equitable educational
opportunities.
We begin with a brief description of education provision in Minnesota,
highlighting key aspects that motivate our subsequent analysis. Notably, even as the state
has relatively high standards, it faces many of the same challenges other states do in
regard to high school graduation, especially for minority males. In the next section, we
report the economic benefits of investments in high school graduation (drawing on our
earlier work, Belfield and Levin 2007; Levin et al. 2007); this shows the substantial
economic benefits of education. We then critically review possible interventions to raise
the graduation rate. We begin with interventions that have demonstrated effectiveness;
we then expand our discussion to include interventions that may have some promise of
being effective. For each intervention for which we have adequate data we calculate the
costs of the investment. We then compare the benefits and the costs of each intervention.
Finally, we draw general policy conclusions about optimal strategies for investment in K12 education in Minnesota.

2. Education in Minnesota
Minnesota has one of the highest graduation rates across the U.S.: 87% of students
graduate within four years of starting 9th grade (compared to less than two-thirds
nationally). However, the pattern of graduation is similar to that across the rest of the
country. Graduation rates are lower for: boys; students in urban high schools; lowincome students; limited English proficient students; and for black, Hispanic, and
American Indian students. Indeed, the last group graduates at rates of 59% (black), 50%
(Hispanic), and 57% (American Indian); and these rates are not much higher than
nationally (the rate for whites in Minnesota is 92%). As for other states across the U.S.,
therefore, Minnesota has significant numbers of minority students – particularly males –
who are not high school graduates. 2 In absolute numbers, each age cohort includes
approximately 72,000 public school students: 9,960 will not graduate on time from high

2

Data are from the Minnesota Education Yearbook, 2003 (email communication, Angie Eilers). There are
many ways to measure the rate of graduation, but they correlate very highly (Seastrom et al., 2006).
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school (of which 4,830 will be white or Asian, 2,520 will be black, 1,930 will be
Hispanic, and 680 will be American Indian). 3
Differences in attainment by race and sex emerge as students progress through
each grade level. In Minnesota (as elsewhere) disparities begin early childhood: 9% of
white children’s literacy levels are not sufficient for kindergarten compared to 21% for
non-white children; for math the respective figures are 7% and 20%. These disparities
are maintained in fourth grade NAEP tests: in reading, 43% of white children are
proficient compared to 10% of black and 18% of Hispanic children; in math, the rates are
54%, 15%, and 15% respectively. Eighth grade NAEP tests show further widening of the
racial disparities: in reading, 42% of whites are proficient, compared to 11% for blacks
and 14% for Hispanics; in math, the rates are 49%, 9%, and 10% respectively. Similarly,
sex differences show up by fourth grade: 42% of girls are proficient in reading and 45%
in math; for boys, 34% are proficient in reading and 50% in math. By eighth grade girls
are getting further ahead in reading (44% versus 31% proficient) with the boy’s
advantage in math decreasing slightly (45% versus 41% proficient).
The high overall rate of graduation translates into high rates of college
enrollment. Moreover, Minnesota has a relatively high rate of college enrollment
conditional on high school graduation: 65% of graduates enroll in college directly after
high school (compared to 55% nationally). 4 Given relatively high proportions of students
who can attend college and relatively high rates of college participation among those who
can, Minnesota’s labor force is highly educated: 35% of persons aged 25-34 have at least
a BA degree and an additional 12% have an Associate’s degree.
Importantly, the higher education system exhibits less stratification by race once
we condition on high school graduation. For those who are high school graduates,
college participation rates are 66% for whites compared to 57% for blacks and 47% for
Hispanics (not accounting for college quality). For those who are high school graduates,
Bachelor’s degree completion rates within six years are 60% for whites, but 42% for
blacks and 48% for Hispanics; for Associate’s degree completion within 3 years the rates
are 42%, 24%, and 28% respectively. Thus, although there are racial disparities across

3
4

Non-public school enrollment is 4,390 private school students and 900 home-schoolers.
This rate includes out of state enrollments.
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the college system, the larger disparity by far in Minnesota is in high school graduation
performance.
Data on school funding is also salient. Operating expenditures across each year of
K-12 schooling per student are $7,796 in Minnesota (AY2002, nominal dollars).
Adjusting for relative costs, this amount is close to the median for states across the U.S. 5
However, Minnesota is a relatively affluent state: as of 2004, median household income
is $56,100 in Minnesota compared to $48,000 nationally (Census figures).
Typically, across the U.S. public investments are lower for disadvantaged
students (Education Trust, 2006). In Minnesota, per student expenditures are higher in
districts with higher concentrations of disadvantage. But is questionable whether these
differences adequately reflect educational need. Funding in districts with over 50%
poverty is 18% higher than in districts with less than 20% poverty; and funding in
districts with over 10% limited English proficiency (LEP) is only 4% higher than those
with no LEP students. In their review of funding for at-risk students, Duncombe and
Yinger (2005) report that Minnesota’s per pupil state aid for high poverty districts is 1.35
times that for the average district. Although this ranks as the tenth highest across the
U.S., the authors conclude that “no state has an effective poverty weight as high as the
estimated weight in the scholarly literature” (p.515). Therefore, given the relative
affluence of the state, Minnesota may also be under-investing in programs for at-risk
students. Finally, we note that schools in Minnesota receive the bulk of their funding
from the state government: 73% of revenues are from the state, with 20% from local
government, and 5% from the federal government (with 2% from other sources).6
In summary, compared to the rest of the US, the Minnesota education system is
one of the highest performing in terms of absolute outcomes. However, it exhibits the
same pattern of performance as other states, with minority males starting behind and
getting further behind through the school years. College participation and performance in
college is less racially stratified; this is the case across the U.S., but Minnesota’s higher
5

Of these expenditures, only 47% are allocated directly for regular instruction; administrative support and
student support account for 16%; maintenance 8%; and other 11% (with 16% allocated for special
education).
6
However, this does not mean that all districts would be equally affected by changes in state aid. The
percentage of total revenue sourced from each level of government varies dramatically across districts: 2%44% from local government; 50%-90% from state government; and 1%-44% from the federal government.
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education system is a particularly notable example. Redistributive funding in K-12
schooling for disadvantaged groups is probably below what is needed to ensure
opportunities for graduation. Finally, more than other states, the burden of education
funding is skewed toward the state. Together, these facts suggest that a key area for
improvement – both on efficiency and equity grounds – is the state’s K-12 education
system.

3. The economic benefits of education
3.1 Methodology
Belfield and Levin (2007) have formalized the method of calculating the lifetime
economic benefits of high school graduation. First, it is necessary to identify the causal
impact of education on outcomes such as labor market activities, health status, criminal
behavior and welfare receipt. These outcomes are selected because they impact on the
total tax bill for the state and on economic activity across Minnesota. Second, these
impacts must be translated into monetary benefits using a consistent accounting
framework over the lifetime (up to age 65). This method examines the economic benefits
expressed in present values for an ‘expected high school graduate’ at age 20. (An
‘expected high school graduate’ is a graduate who also has some probability of going on
to college.) Because of differences in lifetime behaviors, these analyses are performed
separately for males and females and by race. We adjust for Minnesota prices and for the
distribution of dropouts by race across the state. We express all money amounts in
present values and use a discount rate of 3.5% as recommended by Moore et al. (2003). 7
We summarize the calculations from this method and then report their economic
magnitudes. For brevity, we report only average figures and by sex.

7

Present value refers to the fact that a benefit received in the future has less value than one received at
present. Therefore future benefits are discounted by a rate of interest to obtain a comparable present value.
This is precisely why a lottery winner of $ 1,000,000 can get annual payments of $50,000 for 20 years
adding to one million dollars in future payments or can elect to get a flat amount immediately that is more
on the order of $650,000, the present value of a stream of $50,000 a year for 20 years. That is, the lottery
winner can ask for the present value of the future payout. Bear in mind that if $ 650,000 is invested at an
appropriate interest rate for 20 years, it will add up to $1,000,000. What we have done is converted future
benefits received over many years to their present value to society for each person at age 20. For a more
detailed explanation on present value, see Levin & McEwan (2001), pp. 88-94.
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We should note at the outset that our analysis considers the economic
consequences if high school dropouts become graduates as opposed to, say, the
consequences if high school graduates go to college. In terms of economic gains, the
income benefits of education are not especially concentrated in high school. In fact they
are similar across each additional year of education (Rouse, 2007). In other words, if we
imagine one extra year of education has been created, the increase in income would not
be significantly different if the year was one more year of high school or one more year
of college. Hence, focus on the high school graduation rate is as much a moral claim –
raising the economic status of those at the lower end of the educational distribution – as
much as it is an economic one – investing in educational supports that will yield the
highest rate of return. 8
The overall results for the fiscal and the social benefits of each marginal high
school graduate are summarized in Table 1.
3.2 Fiscal benefits of education
The main causal impact of high school graduation is on incomes (Rouse, 2007). The
large volume of evidence has established that the income gains from extra schooling are
not driven by an omitted correlation between schooling and other personal characteristics
(such as ability). There is also very little evidence that the effect of schooling on
earnings is associated solely with receipt of the credential; higher earnings genuinely
reflect the skills learnt in school. Thus, wage comparisons across education and age
levels are likely to yield reliable estimates of the benefits of schooling. From these it is
possible to calculate differences in tax payments by education level.
Based on calculations from the Current Population Survey (CPS), high school
graduates earn on average $475,900 more than dropouts over the lifetime ($550,400 for
males and $364,600 for females). Applying TAXSIM, the NBER’s tax simulation
model, the additional federal and state income taxes paid by graduates amounts to
$167,000 ($200,900 for males and $116,400 for females). 9

8

The economic benefits in other domains are probably not linear in years of education: high school
graduates and college graduates do not differ significantly in their rates of criminality compared to the rates
for high school graduates and dropouts.
9
To account for additional payments in property taxes and sales taxes, we add 5% to total income tax
payments.
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The second significant causal impact of high school graduation is improved health
status and lower rates of mortality (Cutler and Lleras-Muney, 2006). From the fiscal
perspective, those with higher educational attainment are less likely to use public
programs such as Medicaid and Medicare (for those under 65 with disabilities), and they
typically have jobs that provide health insurance. Indeed, as Medicaid eligibility is based
on wages, even the simple income effect of education will reduce government spending
on health.
Based on data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (2004), high school
graduates have much lower enrollment rates in these government health programs. These
differences in coverage rates – reflecting genuine differences in health – translate into
differences in annual per capita costs and so into lifetime costs. The costs vary by gender
and race, but the educational impacts are significant. Over the lifetime, the average
saving to the public health system per expected high school graduate in Minnesota is
$48,900 ($43,900 for males and $56,500 for females).
The third impact of graduation is on criminal activity (Farrington, 2003), which in
turn is reflected in differences in incarceration rates by education level. The economic
cost of crime is high. From the government perspective, there are: criminal justice
system costs for policing and for trials and sentencing; incarceration costs (including
parole and probation); state-funded victim costs (medical care and from lost tax
revenues); and expenditures of government crime prevention agencies. The societal cost
of crime is borne by the victims in reduced quality of life.
The quality of data for analysis of how education reduces crime is not high, so it
is necessary to calculate the number of crimes committed by education level on a per
crime basis. Focusing only on high cost crimes (murder, rape/sexual assault, violent
crime, property crime, and drugs offenses), high school graduation will reduce their
incidence by 10-20% (Lochner and Moretti, 2004). This reduction in crime is assumed to
have a corresponding effect on incarceration rates. Using Bureau of Justice Statistics
data and survey information we estimate the lifetime cost savings attributable to lower

12

crime rates at $31,800 per new high school graduate ($46,600 for males and $9,800 for
females). 10
The final impact of education is on welfare receipt (e.g. cash aid, food benefits,
housing aid, training, and energy aid). Greater educational attainment is associated with
lower receipt of public assistance payments or subsidies (Rank and Hirschl, 2005;
Waldfogel et al., 2007). Indeed many welfare programs are means-tested and so
eligibility will fall automatically as income rises. Again because of data availability, this
analysis is restricted to a few sources of welfare receipt: Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families (TANF); food stamps; and housing assistance (with state-level payments for
these benefits applied on a proportionate basis).
Based on CPS data, it is possible to calculate the lifetime incidence of welfare
receipt by education level. These incidences are then related to the average welfare
payment. Annual figures can be extrapolated to calculate lifetime effects of increasing
educational attainment. The average cost saving to the government per expected new
graduate is $4,100 over the lifetime ($2,200 for males and $6,900 for females).11
The aggregate economic benefit to the government of one more high school
graduate at aged 20 is $251,900 ($293,600 for males and $189,700 for females). The
amounts vary by sex and race with these differences caused by many factors, including
the strengths of educational effects, the progression rates to college, and the involvement
of the different populations in the labor market. In all cases, the gross public benefits
from graduation are very large.
One important consideration relates to the distribution of benefits across levels of
government. Specifically, the bulk of the income tax returns are accrued by the federal
government. In a separate analysis we performed for California we found that only 32%
of the economic benefits were returned directly to the state Treasuries with the other 68%
accruing to the federal government. From the narrow state government perspective,
therefore, the economic benefits are strictly only one-third of the amounts reported above.
10

These figures are considerably higher for males, reflecting the big difference in criminal activity. Most
of these savings are from lower incarceration costs, although there are also substantial savings from lower
criminal justice system costs.
11
Although not trivial these welfare savings are low because: welfare is time-limited; children and the
elderly receive high proportions of welfare funds; and males do not receive much welfare (but they
constitute a large proportion of all dropouts).
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A similar proportion might be anticipated for Minnesota, although the exact figure
depends on tax rates and the state/federal burdens for funding Medicare and Medicaid,
for supporting the criminal justice system, and for paying welfare assistance.
3.3 Social benefits of education
Taxpayers are not the only ones who would reap economic benefits from increases in
educational attainment: the entire state would benefit. The social gains to the state
include the savings to the taxpayer, but there are three additional components.
First, there is the increase in private income earned by each new graduate. This
increase in net income can be calculated as the change in gross income minus the tax
payments. Second, there are savings to society from reductions in crime. Victims of
crime (not taxpayers) bear the largest burden in terms of reduced quality of life and
monetary losses (e.g. time off work). Moreover, all persons make private expenditures
for insurance and other protections to prevent being the victim of crime or to cushion is
financial impact. These costs are much harder than fiscal costs to estimate with
precision: Ludwig (2006) estimates these social costs are 4.5 times larger than the fiscal
costs; data reported by Miller et al. (1996) yields a factor that is closer to 2.5. Finally,
there are externalities from education on economic growth: workers with more human
capital might also make their co-workers’ more productive and attract investment into the
state. Reviewing the literature, McMahon (2006) estimates these externalities to be
worth 37-61% of the total market returns to education.12
The result of adding in these extra benefits is of course to increase the total size of
benefits very significantly. Using the more conservative factors for crime victimization
and externalities, the social benefits to the state of Minnesota are $1,059,500 ($1,236,000
for males and $795,600 for females). 13 This shows that the primary beneficiary of
additional education is the individual, and that the main burden of crime is on the victim
and not the taxpayer such that the societal benefits are much larger than the fiscal ones.
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In an extensive review of the cross-country evidence, Pritchett (2006) suggests that the effect is quite
small and possibly zero. However, this evidence draws upon many countries with very different economic
structures from the U.S. Also, it should be noted that improvements in health (separate from their impact
on health spending) are not included as a social gain.
13
The social benefit equals Y + 1.37*(Y-T) + 3.5C + H, where Y is extra gross earnings, T is tax payments,
C is fiscal crime savings, and H is fiscal health savings. Welfare payments are not included because these
are a transfer across members of society.

14

The aggregate effects are substantial. Each year, with 9,960 dropouts in
Minnesota, the opportunity cost to the state is almost $10.6 billion annually.

4. Costing out interventions to improve K-12 education
4.1 Identifying interventions
Importantly, the economic benefits calculated above are gross. They do not account for
what it costs for the necessary educational interventions to raise the graduation rate or to
fund college progression contingent on graduation. We now consider what it would cost
to increase the numbers of high school graduates. Of course, this requires that we first
identify effective educational reforms.
We adopt a wide approach for finding interventions that work. Potentially, the
options are many, including: reforms to induce systematic and large-scale organizational
or institutional change (e.g. accountability mandates or comprehensive school reform);
policies to influence classroom conditions (e.g. reducing class size); programs applied to
some children or in some settings (e.g. literacy programs); and specific, small-scale
treatments (e.g. peer tutoring). We did not consider interventions outside the school,
such as changes to home or family circumstances, although these are extremely important
and may even be necessary pre-conditions for some educational interventions. Our
literature review included academic journals and web-based literature, as well as research
summarized in education clearinghouse databases. 14 We applied methodological criteria
with priority given to experimental and quasi-experimental research designs over
econometric studies.
Overall, the available evidence does not provide much guidance on what types of
educational investments are optimal under a given set of circumstances (Mervis 2004).15
We categorize the evidence into three groups: interventions with demonstrated
effectiveness; promising interventions; and other educational reforms. The last category
includes reforms which cannot easily be evaluated in terms of how they affect the
graduation rate.

14

These included: www.childtrends.org; www.campbellcollaboration.org; www.whatworks.ed.gov;
www.evidencebasedprograms.org; and www.promisingpractices.net.
15
Of the 300 reviewed by Lehr (2004) only ten directly measured enrollment status.

15

To expand the range of possible interventions, it is possible to consider reforms
that have demonstrated impacts in raising test scores. If we include studies that increase
test scores, we could also add up the economic benefits associated with higher test scores.
This would require another complete study corresponding to that summarized in Section
3. Instead, it is reasonable to equate in-school achievement gains with subsequent
graduation probabilities and assume that the same economic benefits can also be realised.
A number of studies have reported how test scores relate to graduation rates,
controlling for individual and school-related characteristics. 16 Most studies use the
NELS-88 data and so focus on secondary school test scores (8th or 10th grade). 17 The
results are surprisingly consistent. Lee and Burkam (2003) report a one standard
deviation increase in math GPA reduces the odds of dropping out by 32% (although
controlling for school characteristics and socioeconomic status, the effect is no longer
statistically significant). Rumberger and Larsen (1998, Table 5) find that a one standard
deviation increase in eighth grade (reading and math composite) test scores reduces the
probability of not graduating by 48%. So, if the initial dropout rate is 20%, the new rate
would be 11%. 18 Based on data from one large school district, Zvoch (2006) estimates
that one standard deviation in test scores is associated with a 35% reduction in the
dropout probability (controlling for student and school characteristics). Finally, Finn et
al. (2005) find that, based on the participants in the Tennessee class size experiment, a
one standard deviation in achievement in early grades raises the probability of high
school graduation by one-third. 19

16

Recent research highlights the importance of course-taking sequences, particularly in Math. Based on
the Education Longitudinal Study of 2002, math skills are highly correlated with graduation probabilities.
Only 52% of the students who take no math graduate from high school. Only 61% of those who take basic
math graduate. Almost every single student who takes calculus graduates from high school (Bozick and
Lauff, 2007).
17
Although the link between early grade test scores and graduation may be weaker, a number of students
will have already dropped out by 10th grade. As such, the research evidence probably understates the
relationship between test scores and graduation probabilities.
18
Adopting a somewhat different perspective, Lillard and DeCicca (2001) ask: what would be the
consequences on the dropout rate if states raised their course graduation rates? Using data from both
NELS-88 and the High School and Beyond survey, they find a smaller effect: if course work standards are
raised by one standard deviation, the average dropout probability increases by 10-17%.
19
Allensworth and Easton (2007) examine data across Chicago high schools to identify in-school predictors
of graduation. Grades are important: students who do not score any Fs in core subjects graduate at 82%;
students who score at least one F graduate at a rate of 22%. Over 97% of students with a GPA over 3.5
graduate; only 72% of students with GPAs of 2.0 graduate. Each failed course reduces the probability of
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Direct analysis of NELS-88 shows similarly-sized impacts. Our analysis here is
intended to highlight differences in effects within subgroups, not to re-estimate an overall
effect superceding that of Rumberger and Larsen (1998). Table 2 shows the coefficients
from our models determining the probability of dropping out of high school (controlling
for a set of individual and school-related characteristics, see Table Notes). The
coefficients show that there is a strong impact of test scores on graduation rates.
Overall, our results and the prior literature do allow us to estimate an average
overall relationship between achievement and graduation: approximately, increasing test
scores by one standard deviation should reduce the dropout rate from 12% to
approximately 12% in Minnesota. Hence, raising test scores should yield significant
economic benefits.
However, the relationship between prior test scores and graduation varies across
four critical dimensions: the subject of the test and the sex, race, and prior achievement of
the individual student. Sub-group estimations by sex and race are reported in the last six
columns of Table 2. As shown in row 1, the impact of socioeconomic status on
graduation is broadly similar across all sub-samples (with the exception of Hispanic
males). However, the test score impacts are varied. For males, higher reading scores
reduce the dropout probability for blacks but not whites or Hispanics; yet for math scores
the reverse is true. For females, dropout probabilities are very strongly influenced by
reading scores and by math scores with the exception of whites in reading. Thus, for
white students higher reading achievement ceteris paribus yields no advantage in future
graduation opportunities; and in each case (except black males) math scores are a
stronger predictor of dropping out than reading scores are.
Sub-group estimations are reported by 8th grade achievement quartiles in Table 3.
The full sample is given in the first column for comparison, with estimates in the top
panel for reading quartiles and in the bottom panel for math quartiles. For both reading
and math scores, the results are consistent: there is no statistically significant relationship
between prior test scores and graduation probabilities for those students who test above
the median. The impact of test scores on graduation is driven entirely by the

graduating by 15 percentage points. Other measures are also important: a student who is absent more than
20 days in their freshman year has a less than 10% chance of graduating.
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relationships for those below the median in test scores. Thus, for improvements in test
scores to have any influence on getting students to graduate, those improvements must be
made by students below the median in prior achievement. But, if these improvements
can be made, graduation rates will improve significantly. For example, almost 30% of
those in the bottom quartile on math tests will not graduate. Raising their achievement
levels will have a much larger impact on graduation rates than across-the-board test score
gains.
Our goal is to find as many effective interventions as possible, where
effectiveness is defined either in terms of graduation rates or test scores. We also
anticipate that interventions may be effective in various ways, some by raising attainment
directly and others by raising achievement. As examples, interventions may either
encourage families to get involved, such that students are motivated to learn in all
subjects, or necessitate more qualified math teachers, such that discipline-specific
knowledge is enhanced. The processes and mechanisms are less important than the
outcomes. Because our evidence on the economic advantages of education are reported
in terms of graduation, we hope that the interventions which raise achievement also
increase graduation rates. However, given the variation in how achievement affects
graduation (across race, sex, and subject), it is not certain that higher achievement will
raise the graduation rate.
4.2 Interventions with demonstrated effectiveness on graduation rates
We identify a number of K-12 interventions that have demonstrated effectiveness.
Certainly, our list is not a long one of effective interventions, particularly given the stakes
and given that some of these interventions are not certain to raise dropout rates in
Minnesota (and given that few have been replicated). In the next Section, where we
review other possible interventions, we also highlight why our list is so short.
Investing in more high quality teachers is an important investment. High
quality teaching raises student performance and its effect accumulate over the K-12 years
(Wayne and Youngs 2003; Rivkin et al. 2005). Practically, one way to attract better
teachers is to offer higher baseline wages: higher pay should also induce greater effort
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(Loeb and Reininger 2004). 20 Loeb and Page (2000) estimate the association between
higher teacher salaries and high school graduation rates ten years later. Using state-level
panel data, their analysis improves on prior work by including controls for the
opportunity cost (relative wages in other jobs) of teaching. Loeb and Page (2000, 406)
find that a ten percent increase in teacher salaries across the K-12 years would increase
the number of high school graduates by 5 percentage points.
The second policy for raising the graduation rate is to reduce class sizes in the
elementary school grades. Evidence from Tennessee’s Student Teacher Achievement
Ratio (STAR) Project shows strong advantages from being in smaller classes: students
randomly assigned to smaller classes were more likely to graduate from high school than
students assigned to larger classes (Finn et al., 2005). Students in smaller classes in
elementary school reported graduation rates that were 11 percentage points higher than
students assigned to regular classes. The impacts were even greater – at 18 percentage
points – for children eligible for free lunch.
Success for All is one whole-school reform model which has been evaluated and
for which we have cost ingredients. Success for All focuses on promoting early school
success for at-risk students and currently serves approximately 1 million children in
2,000 schools. It includes materials, training, and professional development to implement
a school-wide program for grades K-5 to ensure every child will reach third grade on
time. The evaluation by Borman and Hewes (2002) shows Success for All may be a
good investment because it shows higher test scores at 8th grade, reduces special
education placement, and reduces rates of grade retention. Specifically, the effect size
gains in reading and math were 0.3 and 0.1 respectively. These effect size gains are
significant because Success for All is targeted for at risk students and data from Table 3
shows how achievement gains for these students matter much more for raising graduation
probabilities. Taking the average gain of 0.2, and applying Rumberger and Larsen’s
estimates to a dropout rate of 40% for at-risk students, the graduation rate would be
higher by 4 students after implementation of Success for All.
20

Some economists argue that higher wages will simply accrue as windfall payments to current teachers
and induce no extra effort (Ballou and Podgursky, 1995). But there is considerable turnover among
teachers (e.g. resignations and retirements) that allow for new hires from an enhanced talent pool.
Generally, it would be a very extreme position to say that increasing the wage would have zero impact on
teacher quality.
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In high school, the strongest example of a successful reform is the Institute for
Research and Reform in Education’s First Things First (FTF). This program
emphasizes small learning communities (less than 350 students), long-term teacher
student relationships, mentoring, and teacher advocacy for each student with a rigorous
curriculum (Quint et al., 2005). In a research study using interrupted time–series data,
FTF generated higher graduation rates by 16 percentage points as a result of the
intervention.
Talent Development is a multi-faceted high school reform. It begins in 9th grade
based on new curriculum materials in 9th grade and then develops into a career academy
model (CSRQ, 2006). The model has five main features: small learning communities;
curricula eading to advanced English and mathematics coursework; academic supports
for those needing extra help sessions; additional professional development; and parent
and community strategies. In an evaluation by Kemple et al. (2005), the program raised
progression rates between 9th and 10th grades by 8 percentage points.
Check & Connect is a program to monitor and assess student performance and to
mentor students. This program is implemented in school districts in Minnesota and
targeted to at-risk students. Sinclair et al. (2005) performed an experimental evaluation
for 94 high school students in Minneapolis. Again, the evidence is mixed: there is no
clear evidence that the program raises the graduation rate, but at least by 12th grade the
dropout rate of program participants was considerably below that of the control group, at
39% compared to 58%. If this effect could be obtained in a broader implementation, 17
new graduates per one hundred students would be yielded.
Finally, Achievement for Latinos through Academic Success (ALAS) is a
program that assigns counselors to monitor attendance, behavior, and achievement. The
counselors work with the children and their parents to ameliorate problems, offer
remediation, and provide feedback on school progress. Gandara et al. (1998) conducted
an experimental method evaluation. For a sample of 81 students in California, ALAS
reduced the probability of dropping out in 10th grade with retention rates of 86% for the
treatment group versus 69% for the control group. By 12th grade, the respective
graduation rates were 32% and 27%. Although these differences – based on the small
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sample – were not statistically significant, they may be economically important. With
this caveat, it is worth considering ALAS as a possible program.
4.3 Interventions with some promise
Promising interventions are those that lack rigorous evidence as to their effectiveness but
possess some of the features associated with effectiveness. 21 We focus on high school
reforms (based on evidence from the What Works Clearinghouse, 2006), but also
consider whole school reforms and extended learning programs (summer and after school
programs). 22 However, our investigation reveals that these interventions do not report
the specific inputs required and so it is not possible to estimate their costs. We review
these interventions, but we also describe why we do not provide cost estimates. Given
their effectiveness, it is highly likely that they do yield a positive return to the state.
Mentoring programs
Twelve Together is a program offering peer support and mentoring in middle school and
high school. Students participate in weekly after-school discussion groups. A
randomized controlled trial of 219 8th graders in California found that the dropout rate for
participants was five percentage points lower than the control group (Dynarski et al.,
1998). WWC (2006) estimates the cost per student per month of program participation is
under $300, but this amount almost certainly understates the resource requirements for
the trained adult facilitators.
I Have a Dream is a program for inner-city low-income children from 6th to 12th
grade. The program offers a mentor and facilitator for a selected class of 6th graders and
the funding sponsors who are actively engaged with the students and the school and
provide financial support for students who enroll in college. An evaluation by Kahne and
Bailey (1999) reported graduation rates 34 percentage points higher for those in the
program. However, the running costs were almost twice as high at one site as the other.
The program requires an outside sponsor who is willing to fund college scholarships; it
21

At the high school level, these features are: (1) small school size where students and staff know each
other; (2) high levels of personalization to address students’ personal and academic needs; (3) high
academic expectations as part of a rigorous curriculum; (4) counseling for students with personal and
educational difficulties; (5) parental engagement to support school programs; (6) extended-time school
sessions; and (7) competent, well-qualified personnel committed to the school’s mission.
22
Two programs reviewed by WWC (2006) are not considered here: High School Redirection is not
included because it is no longer operating, and Middle College High School did not generate sufficient
benefits in terms of high school graduation (WWC, 2006).
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also drew on resources (from AmeriCorps and Princeton Project 55) for two full-time
staff members for two years and these were not included in the budgets.
College readiness programs
Talent Search is a program of academic support intended to raise the graduation rate and
motivate low-income students to attend college. It serves about 380,000 students across
over 400 sites. Importantly, this is a federally-funded program, with federal spending of
approximately $800 per participant; state and local agencies also contributed to the
program (but these amounts are unknown). Evaluations by Constantine et al. (2006)
found that high school completion rates were 9 percentage points higher for those who
had participated in Talent Search. 23
The College Advisory Program (CAP) is a whole-school reform that emphasizes
college preparation activities, along with mentoring to link high school students, college
students, and young workers. CAP also makes use of technology to provide web-based
tutorials, including information on colleges and financial aid. CAP has been studied by
Schneider and Stevenson (1999) using longitudinal data on over 1,000 low income
students in urban high schools. An adapted version of CAP called TEACH (Training
Early Achievers for Careers in Health) was evaluated using a randomized trial (Arora et
al., 2006).
Other college preparedness interventions include dual enrollment and AP coursetaking. These interventions help motivate students for college and provide an alternative
environment for learning outside of the regular classroom. Recent research suggests that
both dual enrollment and AP course-taking can be effective (Mechur Karp et al., 2007;
Jeong, 2007).
Employment readiness programs
Career Academies are school-within-school programs intended to promote employment
readiness. Students are instructed with career-related materials and supported to gain
work experience at local employers, with academies operating across the U.S. (Maxwell
and Rubin, 2000). Kemple and Snipes (2000) evaluated the program used a randomized
23

Federal allocations are estimated at $400 per participant per year. This would make the program
extremely effective. However, there is no information on the additional spending by schools to implement
Talent Search. Also, implementation of the program was not uniform. Although 30% of participants
received 20 or more hours of service, nearly 50% received under 20 hours of service.
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trial. For 1,764 students, Career Academies reduced dropout rates for the sub-sample of
at-risk students over the control group (21% and 32%), but no impact on those students
who were low or moderate risk. The costs of these programs are split across multiple
agencies: just over one half is paid by the school district, one quarter by a city
redevelopment agency (CRA), and the remainder by other agencies, including the federal
government, local corporations, and state governments. Other groups provided
significant in-kind supports. Costs data is only available for the resource contribution of
the CRAs and the estimated costs vary according to which component of the program are
implemented. In addition, the program requires significant start-up costs for staff
development, curriculum design, and internships.
Extended hours programs
Extended school programs (after school or summer school) may be promising
interventions (see Carneiro and Heckman, 2002a). These can directly raise attainment
and may reinforce classroom learning; and summer school may ameliorate the
phenomenon of ‘losing ground’ for minorities and lower socioeconomic students when
school is not in session. Lauer et al. (2003) review the positive impacts of out-of-school
educational strategies across the U.S. Based on an experimental field trial in Baltimore,
Borman and Dowling (2006) show that summer school is effective: after two successive
summer schools in kindergarten and first grade, the treatment group’s test scores are
approximately 0.5 standard deviations above those of the control group. A meta-analysis
by Cooper et al. (2000) gives an effect size gain of approximately 0.2 across the U.S.
However, this evidence is for summer schools in the early grades and we cannot easily
translate early achievement gains into higher graduation probabilities.
4.4 Other educational interventions
We would not wish to restrict education policy reforms to only the above set of
interventions. Other school-based policies and interventions might be considered,
including: KIPP academies, Boys and Girls Clubs of America, Sponsor a Scholar,
AVID 24 , Project GRAD 25 , and the Institute for Student Achievement model. 26 None of
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Watt et al. (2006) report graduation rates for AVID high schools at 85% versus 83% for comparison
schools in 2002. However, comparisons across AVID districts and non-AVID districts show lower
graduation rates in AVID districts (see also Martinez and Klopott, 2005).
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these interventions have been evaluated using rigorous research methods. Interventions
with other goals or those that take place outside school may also impact on the graduation
rate (e.g. drug abuse and teenage pregnancy preventions, Lehr, 2004). But considering
the full range of these interventions is beyond the scope of this paper.
Also outside our scope are early education investments. Several of these have
been shown to yield very high rates of return (Barnett and Belfield, 2006). The
High/Scope Perry pre-school program yields 16 new high school graduates and the
Chicago Child-Parent Center program yields 11. Given the benefits of high school
graduation, these programs are likely to pass a cost-benefit test. As well, economic
calculations suggest that Head Start may be a good investment: in their cost-benefit
analysis Ludwig and Phillips (2007) calculate that the program pays for itself even if the
academic benefits are only 0.05 standard deviations. These interventions may be thought
of as complements to the K-12 interventions proposed here.
There are also problems in recommending other popular reforms as solutions for
the low graduation rate.
Privatization reforms to create more options for parents and more competition
between schools may be effective in raising outcomes. This reform encompasses an
array of policies, such as: promoting inter-district enrollments; encouraging private
schools and charter schools; voucher programs; and promoting competition between
schools. However, there is very little solid evidence that privatization will raise the rate
of high school graduation or dramatically increase test scores. 27 In addition, the costs of
privatization reforms are not easily identified (Levin and Driver, 1997).
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Also, although Project GRAD showed modest early gains in achievement, an evaluation by Snipes et al.
(2006) showed negative impacts on high school graduation.
26
Grade retention is not considered because there is general agreement that it does not pass a cost-benefit
test: it imposes additional costs on a school system and appears to disadvantage the retained students
(Temple et al. 2003). Whole-school reforms may change the culture and organization of a school to
enhance educational outcomes (although test score gains are not definite, Borman et al., 2003). Moreover,
there are few economic analyses of whole-school reforms, despite the substantial cost involved in
implementing them (Levin, 2002; King, 1984).
27
On open enrollment programs, the Chicago lotteries analyzed by Cullen et al. (2005, Table 6) show no
gains from winning a place in a preferred school in terms of dropping out in 9th or 10th grade. On private
schooling, Neal (1997) does not identify any increase in attainment from attending Catholic school.
Zimmer and Buddin (2005) do not find that charter schools in California are outperforming local public
schools. On vouchers, there are only moderate gains in achievement (Figlio and Rouse, 2006); some
studies do find competition raises attainment (Belfield and Levin, 2002).
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Raising standards on exit-based exams appears attractive because it might be low
cost: schools already impose some form of assessment, so a replacement should not be
expensive, and tougher exams mean students will have to work harder (and their time is
not a cost to the public purse). Accountability frameworks may therefore help in raising
achievement for some students (Hanushek and Raymond, 2005). However, imposing
exit-based tests may discourage students from accumulating attainment, reducing
education levels for those who expect to fail the test. Dee and Jacob (2006) find gains for
those pushed to study harder but losses for those who drop out early. The net effect on
the dropout rate is therefore likely to be small.
Smaller schools may enhance educational outcomes (Kuziemko, 2006). But the
specifics of how smaller schools operate is unknown and the costs of reducing school size
are unknown. Similarly, peer tutoring is an intervention which might easily pass a costbenefit test: it is primarily attractive because it enlists children to teach other children,
showing strong results for both tutor and tutee (Wolfe and Tefft, 2004). Again, however,
the costs of administering such a program are unknown.
Raising family incomes (either through tax relief or labor market policies) might
raise children’s educational performance. However, temporary increases in family
income do not strongly influence children’s educational attainment (Blau, 1999);
increases in family incomes have to be sustained and ideally for families with young
children (Carneiro and Heckman, 2002b; Duncan et al., 1998). Taylor et al. (2004) find
positive effects from higher ‘permanent income’, but that these effects are not much
larger than those from educational interventions. Recently, Dahl and Lochner (2005)
have identified a strong effect of family income on test scores (up to 0.2 standard
deviations) through increases in the Earned Income Tax Credit. More investigation into
how income supports translate into educational gains is therefore appealing.
Lastly, we consider the issue of ‘teacher quality’. Reconfiguring the teacher labor
force may be an alternative to paying higher salaries as a way to increase teacher quality.
This reconfiguration should involve allocating, hiring, and firing teachers according to
their success in the classroom. But the evidence on how to do this is inadequate. As
maintained by Hanushek (2006, 459), “Estimating the costs of achieving improvements
in the teacher force is generally impossible based directly on current data. We simply
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have limited experience with any policies that alter the incentives for hiring and retaining
high quality teachers” (see also Lankford et al., 2002; on performance-related pay, see
Ballou, 2001). Although raising teacher quality is consistently promoted as a solution for
low educational performance, the evidence base for policy reforms is far too weak,
extending even as far as uncertainty on how to define ‘quality’.
4.2 Measuring the costs of interventions
For each demonstrated intervention we calculate the costs of implementation; where
possible we calculate costs based on the ingredients method (Levin and McEwan, 2002).
We apply a price index such that these costs are in Minnesota prices (Taylor and Fowler,
2006).
For each intervention we calculate two costs. The first is the cost of
implementation per student (the ‘unit cost’ of delivering the program to one student).
The second is the cost to yield an additional high school graduate. Certainly, the latter
greatly exceeds the former because no intervention provided to a student guarantees that
a potential dropout will definitely become a high school graduate; and many students
who appear to be potential drop-outs would have graduated anyway. It is therefore
necessary to offer interventions to many students to yield one additional graduate. The
‘yield cost’ is therefore the ‘unit cost’ divided by the percent increase in the graduation
rate. Importantly, we can only calculate average costs and not marginal costs. Strictly,
the decision to invest in programs to yield extra high school graduates should consider
the marginal cost; however, this cost is typically not available. For small-scale programs
implemented in new settings it may be reasonable to assume that marginal cost is close to
average cost. But for larger-scale programs, marginal costs may exceed average costs.
Finally, in these calculations of costs we separate out the costs of the intervention
itself and any additionally induced costs. Clearly, a student who graduates will be
staying in school for longer but he or she may also progress on to college and this is also
partly subsidized by the state. These additional public costs of education must also be
taken into account.
One complicating factor is that the interventions take effect at different points in a
child’s schooling (e.g. in elementary school or high school). So the cost of each
intervention must be transformed into present values. We transform each money value
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into present values at age 20. This means that each intervention can be compared on a
consistent basis regarding when in the course of a child’s educational experience the
investment must take place and regarding the economic benefits calculated above. For
example, an intervention in first grade will not raise the graduation rate until 11 years
later, whereas a high school investment may do so in only a few years. For these present
values we apply a discount rate of 3.5% (see Moore et al., 2004).
Table 4 reports the unit costs of delivering the intervention to one student in the
first column. The second column reports the yield of new high school graduates. From
this we calculate the yield cost, i.e. the amount of resource required to induce one dropout
to become a new high school graduate.
Investing in more high quality teachers: In present values, paying teachers ten
percent more through the K-12 years would increases the public costs of education in
Minnesota by $2,850 per student. The present value cost per additional graduate would
be $56,850 per student.
Reducing class sizes in the elementary school grades: Following the
implementation of Project STAR we assume a class size reduction from 22 to 15
implemented for 2.3 years in elementary school. The present value unit cost per student
is $12,840. With a ‘yield’ of 11 new graduates per 100 students, the cost per new
graduate is $116,720. If class size reductions are targeted to only those students eligible
for free lunch, the yield of new graduates would be 18. Consequently, the cost per new
graduate would fall to $71,330.
Success for All: Based on the ingredients reported in Borman and Hewes (2003),
we estimate the costs of this program in Minnesota would be $3,842 per student. With a
yield of 4 new graduates, the cost per additional graduat would be $96,050.
First Things First high school reform: Based on cost estimates derived by Levin
et al. (2007), the present value unit costs of this program are $5,440 per child in
Minnesota. The cost per new high school graduate is $33,680.
Talent Development: Based on reported ingredients and our own calculations of
the costs of the 9th grade curriculum and three years of the academy model, the cost per
student for this program is $2,790. The cost per new high school graduate is therefore
$34,850.
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Check & Connect: Based on a template of expected ingredients, the reported
annual unit cost for the program is $1,800 (Minnesota prices, $2007) and it is assumed
that this is delivered for the four years of high school. Accounting for present values, the
total unit cost per student is $8,150. The cost per new graduate is therefore $47,930.
ALAS program: the present value unit cost of the ALAS program over three
years is approximately $3,940 per participant. (This cost is based on our ingredients
method; costs are lower in Gandara et al., 1998). With five new graduates, the cost per
new high school graduate is $78,860.

5. Comparing the costs and the benefits
5.1 Benefit-cost ratios for interventions to raise the graduation rate
We now compare the benefits and costs for each intervention. The benefit-cost ratios for
the interventions are reported in Table 5. The first column reports the fiscal benefits per
graduate. Derived from the evidence in Table 1, these must be adjusted to account for the
additional spending on education in high school and college for new graduates. Hence,
the net fiscal benefits per graduate are $228,630.
For each of the selected interventions the costs per additional graduate are less
than the benefits. The highest benefit–cost ratios are for Talent Development, which is
low cost and relatively effective, and for First Things First, which is very effective at
raising the graduation rate. These interventions appear relatively cost-effective in part
because the lag between their impact and adult outcomes is the shortest. The lowest ratio
is for Success for All and for class-size reduction reforms applied across all students.
However, even here the benefit–cost ratio exceed 1, such that investments pay for
themselves from the perspective of the taxpayer. Also, these reforms are likely to benefit
all students, some of whom would have graduated anyway.
These results are unlikely to be overturned by different assumptions (a full
sensitivity analysis for this method is reported by Belfield and Levin, 2007). Our
calculations are grossly conservative in one respect: they assume that an intervention to
increase the number of high school graduates will have zero impact either on students
who would have graduated anyway or on students who still fail to graduate. The only
benefits that are being counted are those that result from one additional student now
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becoming a high school graduate. Yet, it is likely that even those who still fail to
graduate will have accumulated some skills, and those that would have graduated anyway
will have had their skills reinforced.

6. Policy Considerations
The economic benefits of more education are very strong: individuals, taxpayers, and
society all gain substantially. This is the case even for states such as Minnesota where
educational standards are already high. However, as we show in Box 1, the list of
programs that we are confident will raise graduation rates is not long.
(1) We do not know a lot about what works. Perhaps it is not surprising that so
little is known: evaluating educational interventions is far from straightforward.
Education provision is a complex activity, involving many stakeholders, each with only
partial influence over the children being educated. Overwhelmingly, family background
differences determine educational outcomes, with the effects of a particular school or
program significantly less important (Rumberger, 2004). Moreover, family background
typically overlaps and is confounded statistically with school quality, creating difficulty
in separating the influence of the former from the latter. Educational programs have
diverse consequences, including the development of cognitive and non-cognitive skills
(Heckman et al., 2006), and the relative importance of these skills in determining
productivity and income cannot easily be weighed. Isolating causality from a single
intervention is therefore challenging. For economic evaluations, complications arise
because cost data are often incomplete: accounting data is often confidential; some
resources are provided ‘in-kind’; and funds are obtained from multiple private and public
sources.
(2) The best investments are of course both high yield and inexpensive. Whereas
the latter attribute is obvious, the former is typically given less attention. Higher yields
will obviously be generated by better targeting of interventions yet fewer interventions
are evaluated in terms of how well they target at-risk students (Grissmer, 2002).
Moreover, such targeting is not easily performed as there is little guidance on how to
identify potential dropouts when they are in elementary school. Also, dropouts are not
clustered in single classrooms or schools. Nevertheless, yields will be higher in some
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schools than others and some economists have argued for this to be accounted for much
more explicitly in educational reforms and policy discussions (Wyckoff, 2006).
(3) It is not a given that it is more efficient to invest early in a child’s education
rather than late. Elementary school is not ‘cheaper’ (it is necessary to wait at least a
decade for an impact on graduation), but human capital accumulation is ‘dynamic’:
higher level skills cannot be obtained without the foundation of earlier, lower level skills
(on investing in young children, see Isaacs, 2007). Interventions in high school to reduce
the dropout rate must overcome accumulated deficiencies in academic ability. However,
there are effective reforms for high school students, and these too pass a cost–benefit test.
Indeed, these reforms may have two advantages: there is not a long lag between the
investment and the outcome (graduation); and high school reforms can be more
accurately targeted to at-risk students, using prior academic standing to predict the
likelihood of dropping out. There are also a set of promising interventions that – if they
can be demonstrated as effective – might also pass a benefit–cost test.
(4) Policymakers are not constrained to select just one intervention. It is possible
to offer multiple interventions within the context of a wider organizational reform.
Indeed, as Carneiro and Heckman (2002a, 159) note, “Marginal improvements in school
quality are likely to be ineffective in raising lifetime earnings and more fundamental
changes are required if we hope to see a significant improvement in our educational
system”. Such fundamental change might include several of the above interventions. We
recognize that it is very unlikely that a single type of investment will yield significant
economic returns in each situation. Some students will be reluctant to participate and the
benefits will not apply to all students (Grissmer, 2002). But, fundamental or incremental,
it is still necessary to calculate the costs of any reforms and their likely effectiveness.
(5) Costs and benefits of education are not closely linked. Strictly, there are three
beneficiaries: the individual, the taxpayer, and the citizen. Each obtains some proportion
of the benefits. Yet, the costs are not correspondingly linked to the benefits. Individuals
appear to benefit substantially, so much so that it is surprising that the graduation rate is
so low. Most likely, it is because individuals place a very high discount rate on future
earnings. Taxpayers also reap large benefits, but the federal tax effects are much larger
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than the state effects despite the burden of education primarily being put on the state.
This distortion may explain why public investments in education appear to be too low.
(6) Finally, our review suggests some areas for prioritizing reforms. Clearly, a lot
of educational investment must be spent on teaching personnel, so reforms to the teaching
profession should be investigated further. Further investigation should look at what
makes teachers more productive (e.g. how absenteeism and turnover rates can be
reduced, or how job satisfaction can be enhanced, particularly through improvements in
working conditions), as well as how better teachers raise student achievement.
We recognize that there are challenges to ensuring these interventions work in
practice.
First, some commentators have argued that the focus should be on reorganization
of existing resources to improve the efficiency of the education system. Our results do
not prohibit or preclude the search for efficiency gains. However, the source of these
efficiency gains has yet to be established: promising reforms such as privatization, interdistrict and intra-district competition, or vouchers have yielded very little evidence that
they can improve efficiency. Moreover, the quest is not for the most efficient
investments, but simply for ones that yield a positive return. Our analysis shows both
how much could be spent on interventions and how effective these interventions would
need to be before they would yield negative returns.
Second, these interventions would need to be implemented faithfully and would
need to be as effective when scaled up. These conditions are not simple to meet, such
that raising the graduation rate across the state would be straightforward. Class size
reduction policies in California in the 1990s seem to offer a cautionary tale. In 1996
California implemented a class size reduction policy on a large scale, reducing average
class size to 20 across 18,000 classrooms in K-3 schools across the state (Bohrnstedt and
Stecher, 2002). Initial evaluations of the policy failed to find achievement gains for
students in smaller classes. Critically, state funding for reducing class size was far too
low (at $930 per child in 2004, in small classes, with a one-time facilities grant of
$40,000). This funding amount is considerably below the costs incurred in Project
STAR. Clearly, policies cannot be faithfully implemented if they are not allocated
adequate funding.
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These returns will be significantly influenced by two factors. The first is how fast
costs will rise if the intervention is expanded. Based on the benefit–cost ratios, marginal
cost will have to be more than double that of average cost for the median intervention
(increasing teacher salaries). In the case of “new” interventions, there is also the
possibility that costs will decline as teachers and schools implement the reform as part of
their training and supervision routines. The second is the extent to which an intervention
can be targeted. Throughout we have assumed that the interventions cannot be well
targeted. If they can be perfectly or more precisely targeted, then the benefits will exceed
the costs by very large amounts.
Notwithstanding the challenges, it is imperative for public policy to ascertain the
fiscal and social benefits from high school graduation by determining which interventions
work and whether the benefits of providing them exceed their costs. Research needs to
include an economic component and the ingredients need to be reported in a consistent
framework.
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Table 1
Lifetime Economic Benefits for Minnesota for each new high school graduate
Average

Male

Female

Earnings gain (Y)
Additional tax payments (T)
Government health savings (H)
Government crime savings ©
Government welfare savings (W)

$475,900
$167,000
$48,900
$31,800
$4,100

$550,400
$200,900
$43,900
$46,600
$2,200

$364,600
$116,400
$56,500
$9,800
$6,900

Total fiscal benefit (F)

$251,900

$293,600

$189,700

$1,059,500

$1,236,000

$795,600

Social benefits (S)

Notes: Dollar figures for 2005, adjusted for Minnesota prices, expressed as present values for a person aged
20. Total fiscal benefit F = T+H+C+W. Total social benefit S = Y+1.37*(Y-T)+3.5C+H. Discount rate of
3.5% applied. Figures rounded to nearest $100.
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Table 2
Determinants of dropout status
Full
sample

SES index
Reading score
(8th grade, SD=8)
Math score
(8th grade, SD=12)

Male

Female

White

Black

Hispanic

White

Black

Hispanic

-0.299
(0.026)*

-0.343
(0.045)*

-0.406
(0.108)*

-0.127
(0.093)

-0.277
(0.044)*

-0.424
(0.101)*

-0.313
(0.090)*

-0.010
(0.003)*

-0.004
(0.004)

-0.051
(0.014)*

-0.015
(0.011)

-0.004
(0.004)

-0.032
(0.012)*

-0.027
(0.010)*

-0.034
(0.002)*

-0.033
(0.003)*

-0.014
(0.011)

-0.043
0.009*

-0.037
(0.004)*

-0.036
(0.011)*

-0.028
(0.008)*

Observations
13263
4945
631
820
5194
748
Source: National Educational Longitudinal Survey, 1988-1994.
Notes: Logit models for dropout status (1,0). Each equation includes dummy variables for free-school
lunch populations, minority status, public school, urban school, and whether the school is dangerous or
disruptive. The equation in column 1 also includes race and gender dummy variables. Standard errors in
parentheses. * significant at 1%.
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Table 3
Determinants of dropout status by achievement quartiles
Full sample

Sample split by 8th grade reading achievement quartiles
First quartile
(lowest)

SES index
Reading score
(8th grade, SD=8)
Math score
(8th grade, SD=12)

Mean dropout rate
Observations

Math score
(8th grade, SD=12)

Fourth
quartile
(highest)

-0.301
(0.043)***

-0.273
(0.049)***

-0.356
(0.059)***

-0.299
(0.073)***

-0.010
(0.003)*

-0.024
(0.011)**

-0.035
(0.015)**

-0.017
(0.016)

0.013
(0.014)

-0.034
(0.002)*

-0.049
(0.005)***

-0.035
(0.004)***

-0.029
(0.004)***

15.7%
3305

8.7%
3315

15.2%
13263

26.4%
3326

-0.025
(0.005)***
4.2%
3305

Sample split by 8th grade math achievement quartiles
First quartile
(lowest)

Reading score
(8th grade, SD=8)

Third
quartile

-0.299
(0.026)*

Full sample

SES index

Second
quartile

Second
quartile

Third
quartile

Fourth
quartile
(highest)

-0.373
(0.060)***

-0.233
(0.083)***

-0.299
(0.026)*

-0.248
(0.041)***

-0.358
(0.048)***

-0.010
(0.003)*

-0.028
(0.005)***

-0.003
(0.004)

-0.005
(0.005)

0.002
(0.007)

-0.034
(0.002)*

-0.054
(0.011)***

-0.041
(0.012)***

-0.013
(0.012)

-0.019
(0.010)*

Mean dropout rate
15.2%
28.9%
16.2%
7.4%
2.6%
Observations
13263
3316
3292
3324
3321
Source: National Educational Longitudinal Survey, 1988-1994.
Notes: Logit models for dropout status (1,0). Each equation includes dummy variables for sex, race, freeschool lunch populations, minority status, public school, urban school, and whether the school is dangerous
or disruptive. Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 1%.
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Table 4
Interventions to raise the high school graduation rate
Unit costs per
student

TSI
CSR –
population
CSR – free
lunch
eligible
SFA
FTF

TD

C&C

ALAS

Increasing teacher salaries
by 10% for the K-12 years
Reducing class sizes in
elementary school across all
students (Project STAR)
Reducing class sizes in
elementary school for free
lunch eligible students only
(Project STAR)
Success for All
Elementary school reform
First Things First
High school reform (small
learning communities)
Talent Development
High school reform with new
9th grade curriculum and
career academy model
Check & Connect
High school mentoring and
monitoring program
Achievement for Latinos
through Academic Success
High school program
monitoring behavior and
academic success

$2,850

Extra high
school
graduates per
100 students
5

Costs per
additional
graduate
$56,850

$12,840

11

$116,720

$12,840

18

$71,330

$3,842

4

$96,050

$5,440

16

$33,680

$2,790

8

$34,850

$8,150

17

$47,930

$3,940

5

$78,860

Notes: Costs are expressed as present values for a student at age 20. Unit costs are net of savings for
special education and grade retention. Costs per additional graduate do not include the additional
costs of providing K-12 schooling and college to new high school graduates. These costs are
accounted for in the net benefits.
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Table 5
Benefit–cost ratios for interventions to raise the graduation rate
Fiscal benefits per
graduate
[B]
TSI
CSR – population
CSR – free lunch eligible
SFA
FTF
TD
C&C
ALAS

$228,630
$228,630
$228,630
$228,630
$228,630
$228,630
$228,630
$228,630

Costs per additional
graduate
[C]
$56,850
$116,720
$71,330
$96,050
$33,680
$34,850
$47,930
$78,860

B/C

4.01
1.96
3.21
2.38
6.72
6.56
4.77
2.90

Notes: Fiscal benefits per graduate are taken from Table 1, adjusted for additional government payments
for school and college. Costs per additional graduate are taken from Table 4.
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Box 1
What Works for Raising Attainment?
Programs with demonstrated
effectiveness and known cost
ingredients

Effective programs that may
pass a cost-benefit test if cost
ingredients can be determined

Areas of reform where more
knowledge is critically needed

Reforms where economic
evaluations are complex

Increasing teacher salaries by 10%
for the K-12 years

Mentoring programs
(12 Together, I Have a Dream)

Specific programs
(AVID, Project GRAD, KIPPS
academies, ISA model)

Privatization

Reducing class size in elementary
school (Project STAR)

College readiness programs
(CAP, TEACH, Talent Search)

Teacher quality

Raising standards

First Things First high school
reform

Employment readiness programs
(Career Academies)

Family interventions

Raising family incomes

Success for All

Extended hours programs
(After-school, summer school)

Talent Development
Check & Connect
ALAS
Pre-school programs

School size reforms

